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Abstract 
 
A dynamic, three-commodity rational-expectations storage model is used to compare the 
impact of the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 with a free-
market policy and with the agricultural policies that preceded the FAIR Act.  Results support the 
hypothesis that the changes made when FAIR was enacted did not lead to permanent significant 
increases in the volatility of farm prices or revenues.  An important finding is that the main 
economic impacts of the Pre-FAIR scenario, relative to the free-market regime were to transfer 
income to farmers and to substitute government storage for private storage in a way that did little 
to support prices or to stabilize farm incomes. 
 
Key words: FAIR Act, farm prices, free-market policy, rational-expectations storage model, 
revenue 

  
 
 
 
 
U.S. FARM POLICY AND THE VARIABILITY 
OF COMMODITY PRICES AND FARM REVENUES 
 
Introduction 
 
Historically, the U.S. government has had a substantial involvement in the agricultural 
sector.  Since 1988, annual U.S. government expenditures in support programs for all crops 
ranged from a low of $6.3 billion in 1996 to an estimated high of $24.2 billion in 2000 (Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute [FAPRI]).  From 1988 to 1995, government expenditures 
averaged $3.4 billion per year on corn programs alone.  This amount increased to $4 billion per 
year between 1996 and 2000, after passage of the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform 
(FAIR) Act in 1996. 
The FAIR Act represented a major shift in U.S. agricultural policy.  It replaced farm price 
support programs with direct payments, removed restrictions on the types of crops that farmers 
could plant or the amount of acres that farmers had to idle to qualify for support programs, and 
introduced an alternative to the loan rate program called the “loan deficiency payment” (LDP).1 
The FAIR Act is likely to have a noticeable impact on U.S. agriculture—in particular, on corn, 
soybean, and wheat markets as these are the commodities most directly affected by the specific 
changes introduced by the act. 
Interestingly, the markets for corn, soybeans, and wheat have also exhibited extraordinary 
volatility (in both prices and stocks) in recent years.  Many observers have attributed this 
volatility to the FAIR Act itself.  This linking of the act with recent market behavior makes some 
sense, as the Act reduced the reliance on government storage and eliminated the target price 
program.  However, the FAIR Act also allows producers to respond in a more flexible way to 
changes in market conditions, thereby dampening the influence of weather shocks.  It is also 
possible that the private sector might undertake the storage activities formerly done by the 
government and might do so in a way that makes more economic sense.  Because these aspects 
of the FAIR Act may induce lower price volatility, the net effect is unknown.  The ultimate 
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impact of the FAIR Act will not be known until the market has reached a new equilibrium, and 
this will take decades. 
The problem addressed here is the behavior of prices, stocks, and other market variables of 
interest for corn, soybeans, and one other crop under the FAIR Act regime.  It is assumed that 
private market participants hold rational expectations and behave in an optimal fashion.  The 
analysis is conducted by solving for the equilibrium market conditions that satisfy the optimal 
behavioral patterns of all those involved.  The speculative rational-expectations storage model 
that is used is based on Williams and Wright, Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1996), and Chambers 
and Bailey. 
In addition, the present study is the first one to solve for intertemporal market equilibrium in 
three markets simultaneously, allowing for storage as well as random shocks in both supply and 
demand schedules.  Modeling three markets simultaneously enables explicit incorporation of 
potentially important output substitution effects.  Endogenous derivation of storage demand 
ensures the internal consistency of the model, inasmuch as policy changes imply changes in the 
probability density functions of prices, which in turn should change the demand for storage.  
Importantly, this analysis avoids the famous “Lucas’ critique,” because the model built depends 
only on behavioral parameters that are not affected by shifts in policy regimes such as the one 
under consideration. 
 
Model Specification 
It is assumed throughout that there are three storable commodities: corn, soybeans, and 
“others.”  Attention is restricted to three commodities because (a) the study's primary objective is 
to uncover the potential effects of the FAIR Act on the U.S. markets for corn and soybeans, and 
(b) explicitly modeling many commodities is computationally intractable due to the “curse of 
dimensionality” (e.g., Judd, p. 430).2 
Historically, U.S. agricultural policies directly affected the supply of corn and soybeans 
(Lee and Helmberger) as well as their storage demand.  For this reason, the model specifications 
under the benchmark setting of no government intervention as well as under the two intervention 
scenarios of Pre-FAIR and FAIR regimes are discussed in more depth in the next three 
subsections. 
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Benchmark Setting: No Government Intervention 
Crop production takes one period from planting to harvest.  Output of crop j (j = 1, …, J) at 
time t + 1 (Ojt+1) is a function of the acres of all J crops planted at time t (A1t, …, AJt) times the 
realization of an output shock at time t + 1 (eOjt+1): 
Ojt+1 ”  Oj(A1t, …, AJt) eOjt+1. (1.1) 
Actual production at time t + 1 is random from the perspective of time t because yields are 
stochastic due to weather, pests, etc.  Similarly, actual prices at time t + 1 (Pjt+1) are random from 
the standpoint of time t, due to stochastic output as well as stochastic demand. 
Because of output uncertainty, producers are assumed to make their planting/input decisions 
at time t so as to maximize expected profits at t + 1 ( p t+1), conditional on their information at 
time t (Et( × )) and subject to any existing constraints.  That is, at time t producers choose A1t 
through AJt to maximize: 
Et( p t+1) = Et( å
=
J
1j
Ojt+1 Pjt+1) -  C(A1t, ..., AJt), (1.2) 
 = 
å
=
J
1j
Oj(A1t, …, AJt) Et(eOjt+1 Pjt+1) -  C(A1t, ..., AJt), 
 = 
å
=
J
1j
Oj(A1t, …, AJt) p 1jtP +  -  C(A1t, ..., AJt),  (1.2') 
where C( × ) is the cost function, and p 1jtP +  ”  Et(eOjt+1 Pjt+1) is equal to (a constant times) the 
producers' incentive price or action certainty equivalent price for commodity j (Wright; Newbery 
and Stiglitz).  In general, p 1jtP +  „  Et(eOjt+1) Et(Pjt+1) because producers recognize that their yield 
disturbance is proportional to the aggregate output, and the latter covaries with the market price. 
Objective function (1.2') is quite general in that it allows for very complex interactions among 
individual crop outputs and costs (e.g., Lin and Riley). 
Under standard regularity conditions for the output and cost functions, the acreage supply 
schedules are obtained from the first-order conditions (FOCs) corresponding to (1.2').  Assuming 
perfectly competitive output markets and no binding constraints at the optimum, the FOCs can 
be rearranged in a straightforward manner so as to obtain the following first-order logarithmic 
approximation to the acreage supply schedules (Chambers, p. 167):3 
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ln(Ajt) = a Oj + å
=
J
1k
b Ojk ln( p 1ktP + ), j = 1, …, J. (1.3) 
Acreage supply schedule (1.3) is suitable for numerical simulations because it constrains planted 
areas to be strictly positive, allows for cross effects, and requires only the specification of own- 
and cross-price supply elasticities.  For these reasons, and also because of numerical tractability, 
(1.3) is used in the present study when there are no binding constraints on the acreage planted. 
To ensure consistency with stylized facts, the following parameter restrictions are imposed 
on (1.3):  (a) b Ojj > 0, (b) b Ojk „ j < 0, and (c) å j Ojkb > 0.  Condition (a) is necessary and sufficient 
for the area planted with crop j to respond positively to its own producers' incentive price.  
Restriction (b) is necessary and sufficient to have crop substitution (through acreage shifts) in 
response to relative changes in producers' incentive prices.  Finally, condition (c) ensures that the 
total area planted increases if all producers' incentive prices increase by the same percentage 
amount.  Restriction (c) is also sufficient for the acreage planted with a particular crop to expand 
if the producers’ incentive prices for all crops go up by the same percentage amount. 
Realistic modeling also requires that (a) acres planted with individual crops be strictly 
positive and (b) the total area planted with crops not exceed the total number of acres of arable 
land ( A ).4  As mentioned earlier, acreage supply schedule (1.3) automatically meets restriction 
(a).  As for (b), it is assumed that when the total acreage constraint is binding, the acreage supply 
schedules are proportional to the unconstrained acreage supply schedules.  That is, acreage 
supply schedules are given by (1.4) instead of (1.3) when the latter violate the restriction  
å j jtA  £  A : 
ln(Ajt) = a Oj + å
=
J
1j
b Ojk ln( p 1ktP + ) + ln( A ) – ln[ å
=
J
1j
exp( a Oj) Õ
=
+
J
1k
p
1kt
Ojk)(P b ], j = 1, …, J. (1.4) 
To derive (1.4), denote acres calculated from (1.3) by Åjt, to distinguish them from acres 
obtained by means of (1.4).  After omitting nonessential subscripts and superscripts to avoid 
cluttering, (1.3) may be rewritten as Åj = exp( a j) Õ k k jkP b .  Hence, total acres from (1.3) are  
Å ”  S j Åj = S j exp( a j) Õ k k jkP b  (> A  if total acreage is binding).  But Aj = Åj A /Å if 
constrained acreage supply schedules (Aj) are to be proportional to unconstrained acreage supply 
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schedules (Åj) (note that S j Aj = A  by construction).  Expression (1.4) is finally obtained by 
taking natural logarithms on both sides of Aj = Åj A /Å. 
Commodity j’s aggregate demand for current consumption is postulated to be as follows: 
Djt = a Dj + 
Dj
Dj
1 g-
b
 
Dj-1
jtP
g
 + eDjt, (1.5) 
where Djt denotes quantity demanded for current consumption at time t; a Dj, b Dj, and g Dj are 
demand function parameters; and eDjt is a zero-mean demand shock in period t.  Parameter g Dj 
represents the relative curvature parameter of the (direct) demand curve (Wright).  Demand 
curvature increases with | g Dj|, demand being linear (strictly convex) when g Dj = 0 ( g Dj > 0).  
Demand function (1.5) includes both domestic and international components.  One could easily 
include a separate export demand schedule.  This would add little to the analysis, however, as 
long as the export demand is correctly incorporated into the total demand function Djt. 
All commodities considered are assumed to be storable, with per-unit storage costs equal to 
f j for commodity j.  Under competition, expected-profit-maximizing speculators will store 
commodity j up to the point at which it is no longer profitable to do so.  Hence, competitive 
equilibrium in all markets entails simultaneously satisfying conditions (1.6) through (1.8): 
Ijt+1 = Ojt + Ijt -  Djt = Qjt -  Djt ‡  0, (1.6) 
d  Et(Pjt+1) -  Pjt -  f j £  0, (1.7) 
[d  Et(Pjt+1) -  Pjt -  f j] Ijt+1 = 0, (1.8) 
for j = 1, 2, 3, where Qjt ”  Ojt + Ijt and Ijt are commodity j's total supply and inventory on hand, 
respectively, at the beginning of period t, and d  is the discount factor per period.  Output (Ojt+1) 
follows from (1.1), (1.3), and (1.4), whereas demand for current consumption (Djt) is given by 
(1.5). 
Inequality (1.6) says that, in equilibrium, total supply of commodity j must be equal to the 
total demand for it, where total demand is given by demand for current consumption plus 
demand for storage.  In addition, (1.6) states that carryover inventories cannot be negative.  
According to (1.7), in equilibrium there cannot be any profitable opportunities from storing an 
additional unit of commodity.  Finally, condition (1.8) implies that (a) no storage will occur  
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(Ijt+1 = 0) if storing leads to expected losses ( d  Et(Pj+1) < Pjt + f j), and (b) there cannot be 
profitable opportunities available from storage ( d  Et(Pj+1) = Pjt + f j) if storage is strictly positive 
(Ijt+1 > 0). 
 
Government Intervention Scenario 1: Pre-FAIR Regime 
Government intervention in U.S. crop markets evolved gradually through time before 
passage of the FAIR Act (e.g., see Hoffman or Gisser for a summary of the history of U.S. 
government feed grain programs up to 1989).  For this reason, in the present study the “Pre-
FAIR regime” consists of a stylized scenario resembling the major government interventions 
regarding corn and soybeans in force immediately before the FAIR Act. 
Under the Pre-FAIR regime, corn producers participating in the government program have 
the right to sell their corn and soybeans to the government at a preset “loan rate” (Rcorn and 
Rbean).  This provision of the government program effectively creates a floor price at the loan 
rate, as participating farmers get max(Rcorn, Pcornt) and max(Rbean, Pbeant) for their time-t output of 
corn and soybeans, respectively.  
In addition to having access to the loan rate for corn and soybeans, participating corn 
producers get a “deficiency payment” (dt) provided they “set aside” a certain fraction (0 £  St £  1) 
of their “base acreage” ( B ).  That is, the number of set-aside acres in year t equals St B .  The 
base acreage is a preset figure central to the government intervention program and reflects the 
historical number of acres planted with corn.  The deficiency payment is then calculated as  
dt ”  min[Acornt, (0.85 -  St) B ] ·  cornY  ·  max(0, T  -  Pcornt), (1.9) 
where T  is the “target price” and cornY  is the historical yield for corn.  In (1.9), the min( × ) term 
means that the number of acres qualified for deficiency payments cannot exceed either the 
acreage actually planted with corn (Acornt) or the eligible corn acreage ((0.85 -  St) B ).  The 
product min( × ) ·  cornY  is an artificial corn output figure used for government support purposes.  
Finally, the max( × ) term means that producers are paid the difference (if positive) between the 
target price ( T ) and the market price (Pcornt) per unit of supported corn output.5  In summary, the 
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deficiency payment policy (1.9) ensures that corn producers get a net price of at least T  for an 
amount of corn equal to min( × ) ·  cornY . 
The set-aside fraction (St) in (1.9) is a key policy instrument and is announced by the 
government every year before planting time.  The 1990 Farm Act stipulates that 0 £  St £  0.125 if 
the previous year’s stock-to-use ratio for corn (Icornt/Dcornt-1) is less than or equal to 25 percent, 
and 0.10 £  St £  0.25 if the previous year’s stock-to-use ratio is greater than 25 percent.  Hence, 
the government is assumed to follow policy rule (1.10) to calculate the set-aside fraction: 
St = S(Icornt/Dcornt-1), (1.10) 
where S( × ) is a strictly monotonic function, such that S( × ) fi  0 as Icornt/Dcornt-1 fi  0, S( × ) fi  0.25 as 
Icornt/Dcornt-1 fi  ¥ , and 0.10 £  S(0.25) £  0.125. 
Historically, the number of acres actually planted with corn (Acornt) plus the area considered 
to be planted with corn for government purposes (i.e., the set aside plus 15 percent of the base 
acreage) has almost always exceeded the base acreage ( B ).6  Hence, under the Pre-FAIR regime 
the constraint (1.11) is imposed to model this stylized fact: 
Acornt + (St + 0.15) B  ‡  B . (1.11) 
Given constraint (1.11), the first term in the right-hand side of (1.9) simplifies to min( × ) = 
(0.85 -  St) B , which implies that deficiency payments are independent of choice variables (i.e., 
Ajts).  In turn, this means that if the corn acreage constraint (1.11) is not binding, the FOCs for 
the Pre-FAIR regime are analogous to the FOCs under no government intervention.  Hence, the 
Pre-FAIR acreage supply schedules when the corn acreage constraint (1.11) is not binding are 
given by (1.3) if total acreage is not binding and by (1.4) if total acreage is binding.  Of course, 
under Pre-FAIR, p 1jtP +  ”  Et[eOjt+1 max(Rj, Pjt+1)] for j = corn and soybeans, and the total acreage 
constraint is total acres minus set-aside acres ( S j Ajt £  A  – St B ). 
If the corn acreage constraint (1.11) is binding but total acreage is not, the corn area is 
simply Acornt = (0.85 -  St) B  and the acreage supply schedules for soybeans and others are: 
ln(Ajt) = g Oj + g Ojcorn ln(Acornt) + å
„ cornk
Ojkg ln( p 1ktP + ), j, k = beans, others. (1.12) 
In (1.12), g Oj ”  a Oj -  g Ojcorn a Ocorn, g Ojcorn ”  ( k kcorn k jk -  k jcorn k kk)/( k jj k kk -  k jk k kj), g Ojj ”  k kk/( k jj 
k kk -  k jk k kj), g Ojk ”  - k jk/( k jj k kk -  k jk k kj), and k ij is the ijth element of the inverse of the supply 
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elasticities matrix k O ”  1O
-
b  = [b O11 … b O1J; b OJ1 … b OJJ]- 1.  Supply schedule (1.12) is consistent 
with (1.3).  To see why, note that (1.3) is a rearrangement of the logarithmic first-order 
approximation to the FOCs:  ln( p 1jtP + ) = å k jkk [ln(Akt) -  a Ok], j = corn, beans, others.  When the 
corn acreage constraint is binding, the FOCs for beans and others become ln( p 1jtP + ) = 
å k jkk [ln(Akt) -  a Ok], j = beans, others, and Acornt = (0.85 -  St) B .  Supply schedule (1.12) may 
then be obtained by solving the latter two FOCs for the two unknowns ln(Abeant) and ln(Aothert). 
Finally, if both the corn acreage constraint (1.11) and the total acreage constraint are 
binding, the corn area is also Acornt = (0.85 -  St) B , but the acreage supply schedules for 
soybeans and others become: 
ln(Ajt) = g Oj + g Ojcorn ln(Acornt) + å
„ cornk
Ojkg ln( p 1ktP + )  (1.13) 
+ ln( A  – St B ) – ln[Acornt + å
„ cornj
exp( g Oj) OjcorncorntA g  Õ
„
+
cornk
p
1kt
Ojk)(P g ], 
for j, k = beans, others.  Expression (1.13) may be derived from (1.12) in a manner analogous to 
the derivation of (1.4) from (1.3). 
To determine the market equilibrium under the Pre-FAIR regime, it must be recalled that the 
government buys all of the corn and soybeans being offered by farmers at the loan rate level.  It 
is assumed that the corn and soybeans bought by the government are stored and sold whenever 
market prices rise above the corresponding loan rates.  Hence, for j = corn and soybeans, the 
equilibrium conditions analogous to (1.6) through (1.8) are: 
p
1jtI +  + 
g
1jtI +  = Ojt + 
p
jtI  + 
g
jtI  -  Djt = Qjt -  Djt ‡  0, (1.14) 
d  Et(Pjt+1) -  Pjt -  f j £  0, Pjt ‡  Rj, (1.15) 
[d  Et(Pjt+1) -  Pjt -  f j] p 1jtI +  = 0, Pjt ‡  Rj, (1.16) 
g
1jtI +  = max[0, Qjt -  p 1jtI +  -  Djt(Rj)], (1.17) 
where pjtI  and 
g
jtI  denote storage by the private and government sectors, respectively, and Djt(Rj) 
is consumption when price equals the loan rate.  Total storage is simply the sum of private and 
government storage (Ijt+1 = pjtI  + gjtI ).  Government intervention in corn and soybean markets 
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prevents their prices from ever falling below the respective loan rates; this condition is 
represented by the constraint Pjt ‡  Rj. 
 
Government Intervention Scenario 2: FAIR Regime 
Under the FAIR Act, there are neither deficiency payments nor set-aside provisions.  
Instead, the FAIR Act lets farmers receive fixed “transition” payments as long as they farm the 
land that had been eligible for payments under the previous policy regime (i.e., the former base 
acreage).  These transition payments are independent of the level of market prices and of the 
crop being grown. 
The FAIR Act maintains the loan rate program.  In addition, it introduces a set of LDPs by 
which farmers get the difference between the loan rate and the local market price on their output 
of corn and soybeans.  Producers get the same expected profits whether they participate in the 
loan rate or in the LDP program, because in either instance the net prices received per unit 
produced of corn and soybeans are max(Rcorn, Pcornt) and max(Rbean, Pbeant), respectively.  Given 
that farmers are indifferent between the two programs, the amount they will sell to the 
government (under the loan rate program) cannot be defined uniquely.  Unfortunately, market 
equilibrium is not well defined in the presence of such indeterminacy.  To see this, consider the 
polar cases of farmers that participate (a) only in the loan rate program and (b) only in the LDP 
program.  In case (a), market prices will never be below the loan rate.  By contrast, in case (b) 
one may observe market prices well below the loan rate. 
In practice, the government has the discretion to modify slightly the specific rules to 
implement the loan rate and the LDP programs, so as to make one of them preferable over the 
other.7  Hence, the market equilibrium indeterminacy may be resolved by assuming that the 
government has a policy rule to favor one program over the other.  In the present study, it is 
assumed that such a policy rule consists of a minimum or floor price minjP  such that Rj ‡  
min
jP  ‡  
0, for j = corn and soybeans.  This rule is assumed because, as discussed in the previous 
paragraph, full loan rate program participation entails a minimum price at the loan rate and full 
LDP program participation yields no minimum price (i.e., a minimum price of zero).  Hence, the 
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whole spectrum of possible market equilibrium outcomes may be spanned by letting minjP  range 
from 0 through Rj. 
Under the specified assumptions, the FAIR acreage supply schedules are given by (1.4) if 
total acreage is not binding and by (1.5) if total acreage is binding (with p 1jtP +  ”  Et[eOjt+1 max(Rj, 
Pjt+1)] for j = corn and soybeans).  Furthermore, for j = corn and soybeans, the equilibrium 
conditions under the FAIR Act scenario are analogous to (1.14) through (1.17), except that the 
constraint Pjt ‡  minjP  substitutes for the constraint Pjt ‡  Rj in conditions (1.15) and (1.16). 
 
Numerical Methods 
To analyze the behavior of storage, prices, production, etc., one must first solve for the 
market equilibrium conditions under each possible state of the world.  This is a difficult task 
because the model has no closed-form solution and is highly nonlinear; the model can only be 
solved and its properties explored using numerical techniques. 
As discussed by Judd (ch. 12 and 17), the storage model may be solved in more than a single 
way.  Here, we adopt the method advocated by Williams and Wright, which consists of solving 
the model by obtaining an approximation ( y j) to the price expectations conditional on carryover 
storage: 
y j(I1t+1, I2t+1, I3t+1) = Et{Pjt+1[I1t+1, I2t+1, I3t+1; y j(I1t+1, I2t+1, I3t+1)]}. (2.1) 
Succinctly, the right-hand side of (2.1) is derived by using direct demand function (1.5) to 
express commodity j’s price as a function of its consumption demand, Pjt+1 = g(Djt+1), and solving 
(1.6) for consumption to get Pjt+1 = g(Ojt+1 + Ijt+1 -  Ijt+2).  But j’s output (Ojt+1) is ultimately a 
function of the current action certainty equivalent prices of all three commodities (from (1.1) and 
(1.3)), which in turn may be expressed as functions of this period’s carryovers (Ijt+1, j = 1, 2, 3).  
Further, next period’s carryover of commodity j (Ijt+2) is also a function of this period’s 
carryovers.  Hence, next period’s price of commodity j may be expressed as a function Pjt+1( × ) of 
current carryovers (Ijt+1) and the expectation operator ( y j). 
As pointed out by Williams and Wright, a fundamental advantage of this procedure is that 
Et( × ) is a smooth function of I1t+1, I2t+1, and I3t+1.  Hence, highly accurate approximations to Et( × ) 
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may be achieved by means of a relatively low-order polynomial function y j( × ).  This is very 
important for our present purposes, because the computational burden of using other methods to 
achieve the same degree of accuracy with a three-commodity system would be prohibitively 
high.  In the interest of brevity, the full description of the computer algorithm is omitted, but its 
essence is sketched in chapter 3 of Williams and Wright. 
Also for computational efficiency reasons, the function approximation y j( × ) consists of a 
Chebychev polynomial interpolated at Chebychev nodes.  In addition, the error probability 
functions are approximated by means of Gaussian quadrature techniques, which allow exact 
calculation of the desired number of moments of the random variables with maximum efficiency.  
Details about Chebychev interpolation and Gaussian quadrature are provided in Judd.  The 
Chebychev interpolation and Gaussian quadrature schemes are calculated by means of the 
computer routines developed by Miranda and Fackler.  The programming language MATLAB 
version 5.2 is used to solve the model. 
Eight interpolation nodes per commodity storage (
jI
n = 8 "  j) are employed, along with 
three Gaussian quadrature nodes for each of the six error terms (
DjOj ee
nn = = 3 "  j).  The number 
of nodes is chosen to obtain an acceptable level of accuracy, while maintaining computational 
feasibility.  For any given storage level, the maximum absolute error in the expected price 
approximation of any commodity is estimated to be less than 0.5 percent.  To have an idea of the 
large magnitude of the problem at hand, consider that the key step in the solution requires 
solving 1,119,744 (= J ·  
Õ
j eeI DjOjj
nnn ) nonlinear equations in as many unknowns.  For the 
simplest scenario (“No Government Intervention”), a single additional iteration at the optimum 
lasts 25 minutes with a Pentium 450 MHz chip and 260 megabytes of RAM. 
 
Model Initialization 
Numerical solution to the storage problem is greatly enhanced by “normalizing” the system 
to avoid variables of significantly different orders of magnitude.  For this reason, and also to 
facilitate the interpretation of the model results and parameters, the behavioral parameters are 
chosen so that equilibrium acreage, output, and consumption of each commodity is 1.00 when 
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neither supply nor consumption demand are stochastic (and, therefore, there is no storage).  
Space constraints prevent us from reporting simulation results from all of the parameter 
combinations analyzed.  We show results for only a single set of parameter values for the No 
Government Intervention and Pre-FAIR regimes.  For the FAIR regime, we provide results from 
four alternative parameterizations.  These parameter values were selected so as to be consistent 
with the corresponding existing literature, and they are discussed next.  Results for other 
parameterizations are available from the authors upon request. 
Supply.  The own- and cross-price elasticities of supply are assumed to be 0.4 and - 0.15, 
respectively.  This implies that a Oj = 0, b Ojj = 0.4, and b Ojk = - 0.15 for "  j and "  k „  j.  The 
amount of arable land is hypothesized to be 2 percent greater than the total acreage devoted to 
crops in the nonstochastic equilibrium scenario, so that A  = 3.06.  Finally, output shocks (eOjt+1) 
are assumed to be trivariate normally distributed with a mean of one, standard deviations of 0.16 
for corn, 0.11 for soybeans, and 0.085 for others, and correlations of 0.8 for corn-soybeans and 
0.3 for corn-others and soybeans-others. 
Demand.  The elasticity of demand for current consumption is set at - 0.6, which with 
isoelastic demand ( a Dj = 0) implies that g Dj = 1.6 and b Dj = - 0.6.8  Demand shocks are assumed 
to be independently and identically distributed with a mean of zero and standard deviations of 
0.08 for corn, 0.07 for soybeans, and 0.06 for others. 
Storage.  Annual per-unit storage costs are hypothesized to be 2 percent of the nonstochastic 
equilibrium price (i.e., f j = 0.02), and the discount factor is set at d  = 0.95 (which implies an 
annual interest rate of 1/ d  -  1 = 5.26 percent). 
Government Intervention under Pre-FAIR Regime.  Loan rates for corn and soybeans are 
assumed to be below the nonstochastic equilibrium price and relatively favorable to corn (i.e., 
Rcorn = 0.90, Rbean = 0.85).  It is also assumed that the corn target price is 45 percent higher than 
the corn loan rate (i.e., T  = 1.45 ·  Rcorn = 1.305), the corn base acreage is the same as the 
nonstochastic equilibrium corn acreage (i.e., B  = 1.00), and the corn historical yield is identical 
to the mean corn yield ( cornY  = 1.00).  Finally, the set-aside function (1.10) used is: 
St = (Icornt/Dcornt-1)/[1.2 + 4 (Icornt/Dcornt-1)]. (3.1) 
It can be easily verified that the right-hand side of (3.1) satisfies the required conditions for S( × ). 
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Government Intervention under FAIR Regime.  The corn loan rate is assumed to be the same 
as under the Pre-FAIR regime (i.e., Rcorn = 0.90).  For soybeans, results are reported for both 
Rbean = 0.85 (i.e., the same as in Pre-FAIR) and Rbean = 0.95.  The motivation for this particular 
sensitivity analysis is that, even with constant nominal loan rates, the level of support for 
soybeans relative to corn may have increased due to lower production costs associated with the 
recent introduction of soybean varieties tolerant to the herbicide glyphosate. 
 
Results 
The simulation results are presented in Tables 1 through 4.  The results in Tables 1 and 2 are 
based on a loan program that slightly favors corn (Rcorn = 0.90, Rbean = 0.85).  Table 1 shows the 
specific results for corn, and Table 2 shows the results for soybeans.  The first column in Tables 
1 and 2 shows the base values of the key economic parameters in the absence of government 
intervention and without uncertainty.  These values are reported for comparison purposes and are 
normalized to equal 1, 0, or 100.  The second column shows how these key variables change 
when uncertainty is introduced.  This scenario has no government intervention and is also used 
as a basis for comparison.  The third column shows the results for the Pre-FAIR regime, and the 
last two columns show results for two extreme versions of the FAIR program.  The first of these 
(FAIR-min) shows results when the government sets the LDP payments so that farmers always 
find the loan program to be attractive, thereby allowing the loan program to create a minimum 
price or price floor.  The government would do this by adjusting the LDP payment so that 
farmers preferred the loan program to the cash LDP, i.e., by setting the payment below the fair 
premium for the call option implicit in the loan program.  The second scenario (FAIR-pay) 
assumes that the LDP is always the more attractive option, and in this scenario the loan program 
does not support prices.  For each variable of interest, the mean (in bold characters), the 5 
percent quantile, the median, and the 95 percent quantile are reported.  Whenever useful, the 
coefficient of variation is also provided. 
Table 3 repeats the results shown in scenarios FAIR-min and FAIR-pay using a slightly 
higher relative loan rate for soybeans (Rbean = 0.95).  The motivation for this sensitivity analysis 
is that the relative costs of production for corn and soybeans may be changing, as soybean 
varieties resistant to the herbicide glyphosate come on the market.  If this relative production 
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cost adjustment is underway, then the effectiveness of the soybean loan rate will increase relative 
to corn even if the two nominal rates are constant. 
The fourth table shows the two relative loan scenarios (Rbean = 0.85 and Rbean = 0.95) under 
an intermediate FAIR program regime in which some grain enters the loan program and the 
government pays the LDP on the remainder.  In this regime, the loan program acts to impose 
minimum prices, but the minimum price levels are below the loan rates.  In order to calculate 
these results, the model was calibrated so that the resulting minimum prices were halfway 
between the loan rates and the 5 percent lower price quantiles of the FAIR-pay scenario.  For 
example, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, when the loan rates for corn and soybeans are Rcorn = 0.90 
and Rbean = 0.85, the respective 5 percent lower price quantiles under FAIR-pay are 0.82 and 
0.85.  Therefore, the intermediate scenario for Rcorn = 0.90 and Rbean = 0.85 is calibrated so that 
the minimum prices for corn and soybeans equal mincornP  = 0.86 and 
min
beanP  = 0.85, respectively. 
 
Discussion 
The most interesting comparison in Tables 1 and 2 is that between the regime with random 
effects and no government intervention (i.e., the free-market scenario) and the Pre-FAIR regime.  
These results show that the Pre-FAIR program resulted in a very modest reduction in production 
and a negligible effect on market prices.  This was true despite programs that took land out of 
production and created large government-controlled stocks.  The results indicate that the acreage 
reduction programs were not effective because they removed land that might not have been 
farmed under the free-market scenario.  The intuition is that land allocation decisions responded 
to prices, and when programs pulled some land out of production, other (possibly less 
productive) land came into production.  This similarity would have been compounded by a 
government program that took land out of production when stocks were high (as was the case for 
corn under Pre-FAIR), because the free market would also have pulled land out of production in 
these surplus periods.  In addition, the amount of private storage of corn under the free-market 
scenario is double that under the Pre-FAIR regime, again suggesting that some of the 
government intervention was crowding out an activity that the private sector would have 
undertaken in a normally functioning free market. 
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The greatest impact of the Pre-FAIR program is that farm revenues from corn are 
substantially higher than under the free-market regime.  This additional income is a result of the 
target price program, which provides farmers with free “in-the-money” put options.  Because of 
the way the target price program was modeled, high target prices did not have an impact on 
acreage at the margin.  This is true because deficiency payments were based on 85 percent of 
historic production and not on the actual acreage planted with corn, as long as the latter exceeded 
the eligible corn acreage (recall discussion of expression (1.9)).  The coefficient of variation of 
farm incomes in the Pre-FAIR scenario (12 percent for corn and 11 percent for soybeans) is 
lower than that in the free-market scenario (14 percent for corn and 11 percent for soybeans).  
This reduction, however, seems too small to justify the Pre-FAIR regime as a means to provide 
income stability.  Further evidence in this regard is that the difference between the median and 
the lower 5 percent quantile of farm revenues from corn was actually smaller under the free-
market regime (0.20 = 1.00 -  0.80) than under Pre-FAIR (0.24 = 1.28 -  1.04).  One reason for 
the Pre-FAIR program failure to stabilize income is that deficiency payments tend to be 
negatively correlated with market prices (see (1.9)) but are correlated with production only 
indirectly, to the extent that the latter is correlated with prices.  Therefore, deficiency payments 
sometimes come at a time when corn revenues were high and sometimes fail to come when crop 
yields were low.  This effect is almost enough to offset the other revenue stabilizing effects of 
the Pre-FAIR program. 
In summary, the key economic impacts of the Pre-FAIR scenario were to transfer income to 
farmers and to substitute government storage for private storage, in a way that did little to distort 
prices or to stabilize farm incomes. 
The remaining results in Tables 1 and 2 show the effect of the two extreme versions of the 
FAIR program.  In the first of these (FAIR-min), the program is operated to provide a minimum 
price equal to the loan rate, by making it optimal for farmers to put grain in the loan program.  In 
the second (FAIR-pay), the program is run so that all farmers find it optimal to take the LDP 
payment instead of the loan.  This is modeled as a choice between the call-option premium that 
is implicitly included in the loan program and the direct payment that is the LDP.  Whenever the 
government offers a direct payment that is greater than the fair option premium, farmers are 
assumed to response optimally by taking the direct payment. 
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The principal impact of the assumption about the way the FAIR program is run shows up in 
the amount of storage.  As might be expected, whenever the government runs the FAIR program 
to prop up prices, the government ends up storing a lot of grain.  Another difference between the 
FAIR-min and the FAIR-pay regimes is that the latter exhibits higher price volatility for corn, as 
evinced by a coefficient of variation of 23 percent versus 20 percent for FAIR-min.  This is to be 
expected because prices under FAIR-min are not allowed to drop below the minimum level and 
are usually prevented from taking high values because of the significantly higher (mostly 
government) stock levels.  The impact of the FAIR program assumptions on other economic 
parameters is relatively muted, in large part because market forces adjust to offset the impact of 
the program changes. 
Table 3 shows the two extreme FAIR regimes with a higher support level for soybeans.  The 
impact of this change is to dramatically increase government storage of soybeans in the FAIR-
min scenario and to increase loan deficiency payments for soybeans in the FAIR-pay scenario.  It 
is interesting to note the degree to which government storage crowds out private storage when 
government storage of soybeans increases.  For FAIR-min, increasing the loan rate for soybeans 
from Rbean = 0.85 to Rbean = 0.95 induces a fall in the average private storage from 0.05 to 0.01 
and an increase in government storage from 0.01 to 0.16.  Averages can be very misleading in 
both cases, because the storage distributions have very long tails.9  As may be inferred from the 
storage quantiles, average government storage is so high because there are a few years when 
stocks keep accumulating, which is something that is possible without any mechanism to restrict 
production.  These few years will greatly inflate the average. 
The results just discussed show how important it is to have a feedback mechanism built into 
government programs involving minimum prices.  Note that under Pre-FAIR, mechanisms were 
in place to restrict production that are absent under FAIR.  Under FAIR, farmers find it 
profitable to produce soybeans at the minimum price of 0.95 (as median soybean production is 
1.00 and median soybean price is 0.95), so farmers get neither a signal to reduce production nor 
are ever forced to reduce production.10  The FAIR-min program, results of which are shown in 
Table 3, does not have this built-in feedback mechanism; hence, there is a potential for large 
accumulations of government stocks.  The reason why the average private storage is 0.01 and not 
0.00 in this scenario is that there may be a string of poor harvests, in which case government will 
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store nothing but private storage will be profitable.  Private storage never coexists with 
government storage; i.e., there can be private storage only in those years in which there is no 
government storage. 
Comparison of Tables 1 and 3 reveals that increasing the soybean support from Rbean = 0.85 
to Rbean = 0.95 has a very small impact on corn.  There is a very small increase in the average 
price of corn in the FAIR-pay scenario (from 1.02 to 1.03) and an offsetting reduction in the 
government expenditures on corn LDP. 
Table 4 shows a more realistic intermediate FAIR scenario.  The first and third columns of 
results can be compared with the Pre-FAIR and free-market scenarios in Tables 1 and 2.  
Considering corn first, the intermediate FAIR regime results in more government storage and 
total average storage, slightly lower prices, and an offsetting deficiency payment not in the free-
market scenario.  Price volatility is slightly lower under the FAIR scenario because of the 
increased storage.  Comparing FAIR with the Pre-FAIR scenario, the most noticeable effect is a 
one-to-one substitution of government storage and private storage (0.06 and 0.08 versus 0.08 and 
0.06).  The level of price volatility is almost unchanged, with coefficients of variation of 21 
percent for Pre-FAIR and 22 percent for FAIR.  Farm revenues under Pre-FAIR are remarkably 
higher because of the transfer effect of the Pre-FAIR deficiency payments.  However, farm 
revenue volatility (as measured by the coefficient of variation) is relatively constant across the 
two government-intervention scenarios.11 
Unsurprisingly, soybean results for the intermediate scenario with a loan rate of Rbean = 0.85 
are almost the same as for the free-market and Pre-FAIR regimes.  This is true because such a 
soybean loan rate level under Pre-FAIR had little impact on the soybean market relative to the 
free-market scenario (see Table 2).  An increase in the soybean loan rate from Rbean = 0.85 to 
Rbean = 0.95 causes average total storage of soybeans to increase from 0.06 to 0.08.  Such growth 
in storage is a consequence of the great expansion in government stocks (from 0.01 to 0.05), 
inasmuch as private stocks actually decrease from 0.05 to 0.03.  Government storage expands 
due to the purchases required to support the minimum price, which is increased (from 0.85 to 
0.89) along with the loan rate increase. 
The soybean loan rate increase also causes average soybean price and its volatility to fall 
slightly (from 1.02 to 1.01 and from 17 percent to 16 percent, respectively).  The reduction in 
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average price is a direct consequence of the higher level of stocks, which translates into larger 
total supply.  Further, because of the reduction in average soybean price and the higher soybean 
loan rate, deficiency payments shoot up from 0 to 0.02.  Finally, average farm revenues from 
soybeans increase by the same amount as the increase in government deficiency payments.  The 
reason for this, as is apparent from Table 4, is that most of the government expenditures occur as 
deficiency payments as opposed to storage operations. 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the corn price distributions that are generated under the free-
market, Pre-FAIR, and intermediate FAIR scenarios, respectively.12  Each figure shows the price 
distribution under low, median, and high beginning storage levels for corn.  It is immediately 
clear that all of the distributions are skewed to the right.  Deaton and Laroque explain why these 
skewed price distributions occur in commodity markets.  Large upside price movements will 
occur when supplies are tight because storage cannot be negative.  Symmetrically low prices do 
not occur because speculative storage will take place when prices drop below the level at which 
one can rationally expect to profit from storage. 
Under the free-market scenario, both the skewness and the mean price level increase as 
storage falls.  When corn yields are high, the absence of any price support policy allows market 
prices to fall as low as about 75 percent of the (unconditional) expected level, even if beginning 
stocks are low.  The distributions for the FAIR and Pre-FAIR scenarios are truncated at the price 
level at which government storage occurs.  The Pre-FAIR results show that in years when carry-
in corn stocks are high, there is about a 61 percent probability that the loan program will support 
corn prices.  The comparable value for the intermediate FAIR scenario is about 53 percent.  
However, this value depends on the arbitrary assumption about the way the LDP program is 
implemented. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
A dynamic, rational-expectations model of commodity markets allowing for storage and 
output substitution among three commodities is advanced to analyze the impact of the Federal 
Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996.  The advantage of this model being 
used for the intended purposes is that the well-known “Lucas’ critique” does not apply, because 
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the model built depends only on behavioral parameters that are not affected by changes in policy 
regimes such as the one being studied. 
It is found that the transitional payments created to replace the Pre-FAIR deficiency 
payments are much lower than the payments they replace and this does reduce farm revenues.  
But these revenue losses are not a result of low market prices.  The results also lend support to 
the hypothesis that the changes made when FAIR was enacted did not lead to a permanent 
significant increase in the volatility of farm prices or revenues. 
An important finding is that the main economic impacts of the Pre-FAIR scenario, relative 
to the free-market regime, were to transfer income to farmers and to substitute government 
storage for private storage in a way that did little to distort prices or to stabilize farm incomes. 

 Table 1.  Steady-state simulation results for corn, corresponding to Rbean = 0.85a 
 No Government Intervention  Government Intervention 
 Regime without Regime with Pre-FAIR FAIR Regime 
 Random Effects Random Effects Regime FAIR-minb FAIR-payb 
Planted Acres 1 1.00 (0.02) 0.99 (0.03) 1.00 (0.02) 1.00 (0.02) 
  [0.96, 1.00, 1.03] [0.94, 1.00, 1.03] [0.97, 1.00, 1.03] [0.97, 1.00, 1.03] 
      
Production 1 1.00 (0.16) 0.99 (0.16) 1.00 (0.16) 1.00 (0.16) 
  [0.74, 1.00, 1.27] [0.73, 0.99, 1.26] [0.74, 1.00, 1.27] [0.74, 1.00, 1.27] 
      
Total Supply 1 1.12 1.14 1.17 1.12 
  [0.79, 1.12, 1.46] [0.80, 1.13, 1.51] [0.81, 1.15, 1.59] [0.79, 1.12, 1.47] 
      
Current Consumption 1 1.00 (0.10) 0.99 (0.09) 1.00 (0.09) 1.00 (0.10) 
  [0.79, 1.02, 1.12] [0.80, 1.02, 1.06] [0.81, 1.03, 1.06] [0.79, 1.02, 1.13] 
      
Private Storage 0 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.12 
  [0.00, 0.10, 0.34] [0.00, 0.04, 0.19] [0.00, 0.02, 0.17] [0.00, 0.10, 0.34] 
      
Government Storage 0 0 0.08 0.12 0 
   [0.00, 0.00, 0.44] [0.00, 0.00, 0.53]  
      
Total Storage 0 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.12 
  [0.00, 0.10, 0.34] [0.00, 0.11, 0.44] [0.00, 0.12, 0.53] [0.00, 0.10, 0.34] 
      
Years without Storage (%) 100 23 21 20 23 
      
Price 1 1.03 (0.23) 1.03 (0.21) 1.02 (0.20) 1.02 (0.23) 
  [0.83, 0.97, 1.48] [0.90, 0.97, 1.46] [0.90, 0.96, 1.43] [0.82, 0.96, 1.48] 
      
Government Deficiency Payments 0 0 0.27 0 0.02 
   [0.00, 0.31, 0.40]  [0.00, 0.00, 0.09] 
      
Government Storage Net Expenditures 0 0 0.003 0.005 0 
   [- 0.001, 0.00, 0.03] [- 0.002, 0.00, 0.03]  
      
Farm Revenues 1 1.00 (0.14) 1.28 (0.12) 1.00 (0.13) 1.02 (0.14) 
  [0.80, 1.00, 1.22] [1.04, 1.28, 1.52] [0.78, 1.00, 1.23] [0.81, 1.01, 1.24] 
aBold numbers denote mean values, numbers within parentheses are coefficients of variation, and the three numbers within brackets are, respectively, the 5 
percent quantile, the median (in italics), and the 95 percent quantile. 
bFAIR-min denotes the scenario  in which mincornP  = Rcorn and 
min
beanP  = Rbean.  FAIR-pay denotes the scenario in which 
min
cornP  = 
min
beanP  = 0. 
 Table 2.  Steady-state simulation results for soybeans, corresponding to Rbean = 0.85a 
 No Government Intervention  Government Intervention 
 Regime without Regime with Pre-FAIR FAIR Regime 
 Random Effects Random Effects Regime FAIR-minb FAIR-payb 
Planted Acres 1 1.00 (0.01) 0.99 (0.02) 1.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 
  [0.98, 1.00, 1.02] [0.96, 1.00, 1.01] [0.97, 1.00, 1.02] [0.97, 1.00, 1.02] 
      
Production 1 1.00 (0.11) 0.99 (0.11) 1.00 (0.11) 1.00 (0.11) 
  [0.82, 1.00, 1.18] [0.81, 0.99, 1.18] [0.82, 1.00, 1.18] [0.82, 1.00, 1.18] 
      
Total Supply 1 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 
  [0.83, 1.06, 1.30] [0.82, 1.05, 1.29] [0.83, 1.06, 1.30] [0.83, 1.06, 1.29] 
      
Current Consumption 1 1.00 (0.08) 0.99 (0.08) 1.00 (0.08) 1.00 (0.08) 
  [0.83, 1.02, 1.10] [0.82, 1.02, 1.09] [0.83, 1.02, 1.10] [0.83, 1.02, 1.10] 
      
Private Storage 0 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 
  [0.00, 0.03, 0.20] [0.00, 0.03, 0.17] [0.00, 0.03, 0.15] [0.00, 0.03, 0.20] 
      
Government Storage 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 
   [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.11]  
      
Total Storage 0 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
  [0.00, 0.03, 0.20] [0.00, 0.04, 0.20] [0.00, 0.04, 0.20] [0.00, 0.03, 0.20] 
      
Years without Storage (%) 100 35 34 35 35 
      
Price 1 1.02 (0.17) 1.03 (0.17) 1.02 (0.17) 1.02 (0.17) 
  [0.85, 0.96, 1.37] [0.86, 0.97, 1.38] [0.85, 0.96, 1.37] [0.85, 0.96, 1.38] 
      
Government Deficiency Payments 0 0 0 0 0.001 
     [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] 
      
Government Storage Net Expenditures 0 0 0.0002 0.0003 0 
   [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00]  
      
Farm Revenues 1 1.01 (0.11) 1.01 (0.11) 1.00 (0.10) 1.01 (0.11) 
  [0.86, 0.99, 1.21] [0.86, 1.00, 1.21] [0.85, 0.99, 1.21] [0.86, 1.00, 1.21] 
aBold numbers denote mean values, numbers within parentheses are coefficients of variation, and the three numbers within brackets are, respectively, the 5 
percent quantile, the median (in italics), and the 95 percent quantile. 
bFAIR-min denotes the scenario in which mincornP  = Rcorn and 
min
beanP  = Rbean.  FAIR-pay denotes the scenario in which 
min
cornP  = 
min
beanP  = 0. 
  
Table 3.  Steady-state simulation results for corn and soybeans under the FAIR regime, corresponding to Rbean = 0.95a 
 Corn  Soybeans 
 FAIR-minb FAIR-payb FAIR-minb FAIR-payb 
Planted Acres 1.00 (0.02) 1.00 (0.02) 1.00 (0.01) 1.01 (0.01) 
 [0.97, 1.00, 1.03] [0.97, 1.00, 1.03] [0.98, 1.00, 1.02] [0.99, 1.01, 1.02] 
     
Production 1.00 (0.16) 1.00 (0.16) 1.00 (0.11) 1.01 (0.11) 
 [0.74, 1.00, 1.27] [0.74, 1.00, 1.27] [0.82, 1.00, 1.18] [0.82, 1.01, 1.19] 
     
Total Supply 1.17 1.12 1.17 1.06 
 [0.81, 1.15, 1.58] [0.79, 1.12, 1.46] [0.86, 1.14, 1.62] [0.83, 1.06, 1.30] 
     
Current Consumption 1.00 (0.09) 1.00 (0.10) 1.00 (0.06) 1.01 (0.09) 
 [0.81, 1.03, 1.06] [0.79, 1.02, 1.12] [0.86, 1.03, 1.03] [0.83, 1.03, 1.11] 
     
Private Storage 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.06 
 [0.00, 0.02, 0.17] [0.00, 0.10, 0.34] [0.00, 0.00, 0.05] [0.00, 0.03, 0.19] 
     
Government Storage 0.12 0 0.16 0 
 [0.00, 0.00, 0.52]  [0.00, 0.10, 0.59]  
     
Total Storage 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.06 
 [0.00, 0.12, 0.52] [0.00, 0.10, 0.34] [0.00, 0.10, 0.59] [0.00, 0.03, 0.19] 
     
Years without Storage (%) 20 23 22 35 
     
Price 1.02 (0.21) 1.03 (0.23) 1.01 (0.13) 1.01 (0.17) 
 [0.90, 0.96, 1.43] [0.83, 0.96, 1.48] [0.95, 0.95, 1.29] [0.84, 0.96, 1.37] 
     
Government Deficiency Payments 0 0.01 0 0.03 
  [0.00, 0.00, 0.09]  [0.00, 0.00, 0.13] 
     
Government Storage Net Expenditures 0.005 0 0.01 0 
 [- 0.002, 0.00, 0.03]  [0.00, 0.004, 0.04]  
     
Farm Revenues 1.00 (0.13) 1.02 (0.14) 1.00 (0.10) 1.03 (0.10) 
 [0.78, 1.00, 1.23] [0.81, 1.01, 1.24] [0.83, 1.00, 1.19] [0.88, 1.02, 1.22] 
aBold numbers denote mean values, numbers within parentheses are coefficients of variation, and the three numbers within brackets are, respectively, the 5 
percent quantile, the median (in italics), and the 95 percent quantile. 
bFAIR-min denotes the scenario in which mincornP  = Rcorn and 
min
beanP  = Rbean.  FAIR-pay denotes the scenario in which 
min
cornP  = 
min
beanP  = 0. 
 
 Table 4.  Steady-state simulation results for corn and soybeans under the FAIR regime, corresponding to intermediate floor pricesa 
 Corn  Soybeans 
 
min
cornP  = 0.86, 
min
beanP  = 0.85, 
Rbean = 0.85 
min
cornP  = 0.86, 
min
beanP  = 0.89, 
Rbean = 0.95 
min
cornP  = 0.86, 
min
beanP  = 0.85, 
Rbean = 0.85 
min
cornP  = 0.86, 
min
beanP  = 0.89, 
Rbean = 0.95 
Planted Acres 1.00 (0.02) 1.00 (0.02) 1.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 
 [0.97, 1.00, 1.03] [0.97, 1.00, 1.03] [0.97, 1.00, 1.02] [0.98, 1.00, 1.02] 
     
Production 1.00 (0.16) 1.00 (0.16) 1.00 (0.11) 1.00 (0.11) 
 [0.74, 1.00, 1.27] [0.74, 1.00, 1.27] [0.82, 1.00, 1.18] [0.82, 1.00, 1.19] 
     
Total Supply 1.14 1.14 1.06 1.09 
 [0.80, 1.13, 1.52] [0.80, 1.13, 1.50] [0.83, 1.06, 1.30] [0.84, 1.08, 1.37] 
     
Current Consumption 1.00 (0.09) 1.00 (0.10) 1.00 (0.08) 1.00 (0.08) 
 [0.80, 1.02, 1.10] [0.80, 1.02, 1.10] [0.83, 1.02, 1.10] [0.84, 1.03, 1.07] 
     
Private Storage 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.03 
 [0.00, 0.06, 0.22] [0.00, 0.06, 0.23] [0.00, 0.03, 0.15] [0.00, 0.00, 0.10] 
     
Government Storage 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.05 
 [0.00, 0.00, 0.42] [0.00, 0.00, 0.41] [0.00, 0.00, 0.10] [0.00, 0.00, 0.30] 
     
Total Storage 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.08 
 [0.00, 0.11, 0.42] [0.00, 0.10, 0.41] [0.00, 0.04, 0.20] [0.00, 0.05, 0.30] 
     
Years without Storage (%) 22 22 35 32 
     
Price 1.02 (0.22) 1.02 (0.22) 1.02 (0.17) 1.01 (0.16) 
 [0.86, 0.96, 1.46] [0.86, 0.96, 1.46] [0.85, 0.96, 1.37] [0.89, 0.95, 1.35] 
     
Government Deficiency Payments 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
 [0.00, 0.00, 0.05] [0.00, 0.00, 0.05] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.07] 
     
Government Storage Net Expenditures 0.002 0.002 0.0003 0.002 
 [0.00, 0.00, 0.02] [0.00, 0.00, 0.02] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.02] 
     
Farm Revenues 1.01 (0.13) 1.01 (0.13) 1.00 (0.10) 1.02 (0.10) 
 [0.80, 1.01, 1.24] [0.80, 1.01, 1.24] [0.85, 0.99, 1.21] [0.86, 1.02, 1.21] 
aBold numbers denote mean values, numbers within parentheses are coefficients of variation, and the three numbers within brackets are, respectively, the 5 
percent quantile, the median (in italics), and the 95 percent quantile. 
  
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
 
1. The loan rate program in place before the FAIR Act allowed farmers to borrow (at a county-specific 
loan rate per bushel) against stored grain and to repay this loan only when market prices made it 
worthwhile to the farmer.  This program resulted in government-owned storage and may have put a 
floor under commodity prices.  Under FAIR, the LDP program was introduced to reduce government 
involvement in stocks and to offer farmers a choice between the loan program and a direct payment 
equal to the difference between local cash prices (as measured by the government) and the loan rate. 
 
2. For example, the commodity problem analyzed here requires us to solve for J ·  72J unknowns in J ·  
72J nonlinear equations for each scenario, where J is the number of commodities analyzed.  That is, 
going from 3 to 4 commodities implies a 96-fold increase in the number of unknown variables that 
have to be solved for, from 1,119,744 to 107,495,424. 
 
3. This logarithmic approximation implies expansion around a vector of ones, which is consistent with 
the normalization used for the present simulations (see the “Model Initialization” section). 
 
4. Restriction (b) is also required to model meaningfully the Pre-FAIR regime’s set-aside policy (see the 
discussion in the “Government Intervention Scenario 2: FAIR Regime,” section). 
 
5. Technically, the max(× ) term in (1.9) should have max(Rcorn, Pcornt) instead of Pcornt.  But in market 
equilibrium Pcornt ‡  Rcorn because corn producers will never sell their corn at prices below the loan rate 
Rcorn. 
 
6. It is often argued that the main explanation for this fact is the producers’ fear of losing their base 
acreage. 
 
7. The LDP payment is supposed to equal the difference between local cash prices and the local loan 
rate.  In reality, the program has been run so that the federal government has had a high level of 
control over the way the local cash prices were measured.  It has done this by calculating local cash 
prices as the difference between prices at export destinations less some county-specific transportation 
costs.  The government has adjusted these transportation costs to obtain local cash prices yielding the 
desired LDP payments.  For example, in 1998 there were many instances in which actual local cash 
prices were between $0.15/bushel and $0.20/bushel above the government estimates of local cash 
prices.  This resulted in artificially large LDP payments and caused most producers to take the LDP 
payment rather than to participate in the loan program. 
 
8. Results show that the level of price volatility (though not the cross-policy comparison) is very 
sensitive to the magnitude of the demand elasticity.  Therefore, the reported results correspond to a 
demand elasticity that gave a price volatility similar to that experienced during the pre-FAIR period.  
The sensitivity of the price volatility to the magnitude of the demand elasticity may suggest a more 
accurate way of estimating price elasticities when volatility levels are known. 
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9. Average storage is calculated by adding up the amounts stored each year and dividing this sum by the 
number of years. 
 
10. It could be argued that the actual FAIR regime has such a built-in mechanism.  If stocks do start to 
accumulate, the government can change the parameters of the LDP program to make the LDP 
payment preferable to the loan program.  To do this it would report a posted cash price (PCP) that is 
lower than actual cash prices in that county on that date.  Because the LDP payment equals the loan 
rate minus the PCP, the use of a smaller PCP will increase the incentive to take the cash payment 
instead of putting the grain under loan.  However, this feedback mechanism is not described in any 
official publications, so it is difficult to incorporate this possible feedback mechanism in the present 
analysis. 
 
11. The analysis excludes the direct transition payments included in the actual FAIR program.  These 
payments are equal to about 10 percent of the value of corn output.  If transition payments were 
included in the FAIR farm revenues, the Pre-FAIR program would continue to have substantially 
higher farm revenues. 
 
12. Figure 3 depicts the intermediate FAIR regime with the high soybean loan rate (Rbean = 0.95).  The 
graph for the low soybean loan rate (Rbean = 0.895) is omitted in the interest of space, as it is similar to 
Figure 3.
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